Interesante artículo sobre Teoría del Ciclo y la crisis del 2008

Es de Leónidas Zelmanovitz. Se encuentra acá: http://www.unilibre.edu.co/CriterioLibre/images/revistas/15/art1.pdf

Ya el resumen puede generar polémica:

RESUMEN

LA TEORÍA AUSTRÍACA DEL CICLO ECONÓMICO Y LA RECIENTE CRISIS FINANCIERA

La argumentación de este artículo se basa en el reconocimiento de de que la Teoría Austríaca del Ciclo Económico está desactualizada en su descripción de cómo los efectos del fenómeno monetario son transmitidos al sector real y generan ciclos de negocio.

En el artículo se sostiene que hay limitaciones epistemológicas para prevenir exitosamente las expansiones inflacionarias por la adopción de políticas específicas de inflación y que la adopción de dichas políticas es la causa del “boom” económico que terminó en 2007. También se describe cómo ocurrió la contracción monetaria empezando en septiembre de 2008 y que se ofrece como una explicación para el inicio del declive. Finalmente, una vez el declive inició hubo una respuesta prudente de las autoridades monetarias. Una respuesta que habría sido la imitación de las reacciones de los proveedores de dinero, competidores en un mercado libre y que sería el curso de acción apropiado bajo los actuales acuerdos monetarios.

Palabras clave: Escuela de Economía Austríaca, ciclo económico, crisis financiera.

Clasificación JEL: B25, E44, E65..

Otra de The Economist, análsis sobre la corrupción en el fútbol argentino

Corruption in Argentine football

    Foul play

Feb 18th 2012, 14:23 by D.S. | BUENOS AIRES

RENOWNED worldwide for their sublime skills, Argentina’s footballers are a source of great pride to their countrymen. Yet few law-abiding Argentines hold their football league in similar high regard. Many of those involved in it are tainted by corruption, from club presidents down to security guards at matches. Money laundering in the system is thought to be rife. In a long-overdue effort to clean up the game, the government this month introduced new financial-disclosure requirements for the league and its teams. But these still pale in comparison with the scale of the problem.

Argentina has been under pressure to combat corruption since last June, when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international body set up to fight money laundering, placed it on a “grey list” of countries whose efforts to root out wrongdoing do not measure up. Although the FATF did not single out football, it had expressed its concerns about money laundering in the game in a report published in July 2009, which made reference to Argentina. Inclusion on the grey list carries an implicit warning that a country risks ending up on the FATF’s notorious “black list” unless it makes progress. Countries in that category have, in the past, found it extremely difficult to do business with any of the FATF’s 34 members, which include big economies like America, Britain and France, as well as Mexico, another Latin American heavyweight.

Largely in response to the FATF’s criticisms, the government this month forced the Argentine Football Association, the sport’s national governing body, to adopt a new set of rules. For a start, it must file an annual report on every member of staff paid at least $13,800 a year (including bonuses, prizes and gifts), as must every club in the top two divisions of the league. They also have to provide details of payments they make to corporate sponsors, government officials and anybody else with whom they do business. Failure to disclose this information can result in a fine of up to $23,000. And if reports uncover evidence of illegal payments, the fine can be as much as ten times the sum involved. Unless the Argentine Football Association strictly enforces the new rules, the government says it will withdraw the $200m it provides each year so that football fans can enjoy televised matches free of charge.

None of this is likely to be sufficient to stop the rot. Corruption has flourished due largely to the activities of the so-called barrabravas, violent groups of fans with interests in organised crime. The story of their rise dates back to the 1950s, when officials started trading free tickets for fans’ votes, which they needed to win election to a club’s board. As these fans grew more powerful and demanding, they began to take illicit control of club affairs like ticketing and the sale of refreshments during matches. Today, club directors often owe their positions entirely to barrabravas. Footballers are also under their control, sometimes splitting wages with them. Players from Boca Juniors, Argentina’s most popular club, even visited Rafael Di Zeo (pictured), the former boss of the team’s barrabrava, when he was in jail (he was released in May 2010 after serving more than three years for assault).

Barrabravas have already taken some blame for the decline of several big clubs in recent years. The most notable case is that of River Plate, one of the oldest teams in Latin America, which was relegated to the second division last year for the first time in its 110-year history. Its demotion followed years of mismanagement and corruption—exacerbated by infighting between members of the club’s own barrabrava—that left it saddled with huge debts, forcing it to sell its most gifted players to wealthy European clubs.

The new rules are certainly a step in the right direction for Argentina. Besides making it harder for miscreants to launder money with impunity, the government has given the Argentine Football Association an incentive to police the system effectively by threatening to withdraw its funding of television coverage. But having shown scant regard for existing laws and regulations, the barrabravas seem unlikely to pay much heed to new rules on financial disclosure. If Argentina’s government is serious about ending the corruption, it will need to confront the gangs on the terraces and in the streets. That is an altogether tougher prospect.

Propuestas de Public Choice

He hecho pedidos de bibliografía antes y agradezco ahora todas las respuestas que fueron muy útiles.

Y va otra: agradeceré ahora si me recomiendan algún artículo que incluya o resuma las propuestas constitucionales de Public Choice, o si tienen ustedes su propia lista personal. Me refiero a esas tales como: limitación constitucional para endeudamiento público, referendo para aumento de impuestos, etc.

Saludos

MK

El Euro y la crisis europea

Estimados,

Martin Feldstein ha publicado un paper sobre la crisis de Europa. Se encuentra aquí: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17617.pdf

Este es el abstract:

The creation of the euro should now be recognized as an experiment that has led to the sovereign debt crisis in several countries, the fragile condition of major European banks, the high levels of unemployment, and the large trade deficits that now exist in most Eurozone countries. Although the European Central Bank managed the euro in a way that achieved a low rate of inflation, other countries both in Europe and elsewhere have also had a decade of low inflation without incurring the costs of a monetary union. The emergence of these problems just a dozen years after the start of the euro in 1999 was not an accident or the result of bureaucratic mismanagement but the inevitable consequence of imposing a single currency on a very heterogeneous group of countries, a heterogeneity that includes not only economic structures but also fiscal traditions and social attitudes. This paper reviews (1) the reasons for these economic problems, (2) the political origins of the European Monetary Union, (3) the current attempts to solve the sovereign debt problem, (4) the long-term problem of inter-country differences of productivity growth and competitiveness, (5) the special problems of Greece and Italy, (6) and the pros and cons of a Greek departure from the Eurozone.

Pregunto: ¿en qué medida se le puede echar la culpa de una crisis «fiscal» y de endeudamiento a la creación del Euro, estemos o no de acuerdo con la moneda única?

Monopolios naturales

Estimados,

Un alumno va a preparar su trabajo final de la materia sobre el tema «monopolios naturales». Les agradecería todo dato respecto a buenos artículos sobre el tema que estén disponibles en la web, tanto sea en castellano como en inglés.

Gracias

MK

¿Acuerdo bueno o malo según la teoría?

El reciente acuerdo de los países de la Unión Europea, y el desacuerdo británico, ¿cómo pueden interpretarse a la luz de la teoría? Está claro que en las decisiones de cada país entran en juego cuestiones políticas locales, defensa de ciertos sectores, etc, pero eso ocurre siempre.

Propongo dos interpretaciones alternativas:

1. Negativa: los países que firman el pacto no van a cumplir los compromisos fiscales, es todo humo. E Inglaterra quiso quedar afuera para tener flexibilidad monetaria y fiscal «keynesiana».

2. Positiva: Se dio el mejor resultado que se hubiera podido imaginar. Por un lado, 26 países de la UE se comprometen a nivel constitucional a imponer límites al déficit fiscal (norma que propusiera siempre James Buchanan). Por otro, Inglaterra queda afuera y salva al sector financiero de mayores regulaciones.

¿Qué piensan?

Tamaño óptimo del estado

Este trabajo publicado por Cato hace un buen punto, aunque en general no me parece claro el trabajo. Básicamente es que el nivel de gasto/PBI no dice mucho respecto al crecimiento económico y el nivel de progreso de un país. Claro, puede tener un gasto bajo pero una economía super regulada o, como sucede en muchos de Centro América, bajo gasto y falta de seguridad jurídica da bajo nivel de PBI:

http://www.cato.org/pubs/dbp/dbp7.pdf