¿Qué regla monetaria deberían aplicar los bancos centrales?

El debate tradicional de la política monetaria que debería aplicar la Fed o cualquier Banco Central divide a los economistas entre las reglas y la discrecionalidad (en este foro sabemos, además, que Hayek encabeza una lista de economistas que propusieron otras alternativas). Pero si nos circunscribimos estrictamente al debate tradicional, quienes creemos en las reglas también nos encontramos divididos en diferentes alternativas:1. Inflation targeting, 2. Regla de Taylor, 3. Regla de Friedman, 4.  NGDP targeting, 5. Norma de la productividad, 6 Regla de la tasa de interés natural, son algunas de ellas.

Nicolás Cachanosky cuestionó recientemente al NGDP targeting. Junto a Erwin Rosen, nosotros definimos la NRI Rule.

John Cochran referenció estos trabajos en su nueva columna en el Mises Daily, donde además cita a Alexander William Salter, “Is There a Self-Enforcing Monetary Constitution?”, y el trabajo de Alexander William Salter y Thomas Hogan, “A Hiccup in NGDP Targeting: Supply-Side Problems with Demand-Side Policy.” El mismo Cochran nos proporciona de una evaluación de las reformas monetarias planteadas desde la Escuela Austriaca.

Tomamos aquí un extracto:

In a recent Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics article, “The Natural Rate of Interest,” Edwin Rosen and Adrian Ravier explain why. Central banks are likely to be key institutions for the “foreseeable future.” Hence, the end of “government interference with the market in general and its manipulation of the money supply in particular” is “an unrealistic aspiration.” Given this realty, the “objective becomes how best to minimize its [central banking’s] unfortunate negative impact on the economy.” Austrians are uniquely positioned to provide answers that are more likely to ensure suggested rules that address the “two significant weaknesses” all central banks face: “susceptibility to political pressure and inadequate economic knowledge.” Moreover, Austrians best understand the true nature of “sound money” and its “symptoms … full employment and economic stability.” Rosen and Ravier recommend a rule “that follows Wicksell’s monetary equilibrium doctrine.” While they recognize the rule would “not eliminate short term price fluctuations” they believe their proposed rule would lead to results more conducive to “inflation free economic stability” and “sustained growth” which has been missing in the US since the inception of the Fed. Other Austrian or Austrian-influenced economists have already made significant contributions to the discussion. Examples include Nicolás Cachanosky, “NGDP Targeting: Is 5 Percent Too Much?” Alexander William Salter, “Is There a Self-Enforcing Monetary Constitution?” and Alexander William Salter and Thomas Hogan, “A Hiccup in NGDP Targeting: Supply-Side Problems with Demand-Side Policy.” Cochran provides an assessment of some proposed reforms from an Austrian perspective.