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La crisis financiera del 2008 ha generado bastante movimiento en la economía, que ha tratado de ofrecer respuesta a qué motivos generaron el problema. No son pocos los economistas (no ‘austriacos’) que ofrecen una lectura Mises-Hayek de la crisis. Por ejemplo:

Anna Schwartz (2007). The Role of Monetary Policy in the Face of the Crisis. Cato Journal 27.2:159-163.

It has become a chiché to refer to an asset booms as a mania. The cliché, however, obscures why ordinary folk become avid buyers of whatever object has become the target of desire. An asset boom is propagated by an expansive monetary policy that lowers interest rates and induces borrowing beyond prudent bounds to acquire the asset. (p. 19)

Diamond and Rajan (2009). The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies. NBER Working Papers.

[e]xtremely accomodative monetary policy by the world’s central banks, led by the Federal Reserve, ensured the world did not suffer a deeps recession. The low interest rates in a number of countries ignited demand for housing. Housing prices started rising as did housing investment. (p. 2)

Allan Meltzer (2009). Reflections on the Financial Crisis. Cato Journal 29.1:25-30.

[w]e must note the role of the Federal Reserve in the Financial Crisis. Alan Greenspan did make a mistake. he kept interest rates too low, too long. That was a mistake. The risk of deflation in an economy with our budget deficit and the long-term prospect of the decline of the dollar seems to me to be minimal. In any case he thought we faced deflation, so he kept monetary policy too easy for too long. (p. 28)

John B. Taylor (2009). Getting Off Track. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press.

[The deviation from the Taylor rule] was unusually large; no greater or more persistent deviation of actual Fed policy has been since the turbulent days of the 1970s. This is clear evidence of monetary excess during the period leading to the housing boom. (p. 2)

De forma más explícita, algunos autores expresamente se han referido a la teoria austriaca o de Mises-Hayek del ciclo económico.

Diamond y Rajan (2009). Illiquidity and Interest Rate Policy. NBER Working Papers

[Our] model [built on the Austrian theory] suggests that the crisis of 2007-2009 may not be unrelated to the actions of the Federal Reserve earlier in the decade, […] but also in promising to intervene to pick up the pieces in case of an asset price collapse – the so-called Greenspan put. (p. 33)

Lal, Deepak (2010). The Great Crash of 2008: Causes and Consequences. Cato Journal 30.2:265-277.

Hayek provides the best diagnosis of the cause of the current crisis, neither he nor Keynes provides an adequate explanation of the financial aspects of the business cycles, assuming these are endogenous to the fluctuations in the real economy. […] This provides a succinct explanation of the current crisis and pointers to its cure. We have a Hayekian recession with Fisherian consequences. (p. 271)

Axel Leijonhufvud. (2009). Out of the Corridor: Keynes and the Crisis. Cambridge Journal of Economics 33.4:741-757.

[The financial crisis] is a variation on the Austrian overinvestment (or malinvestment) theme. (p. 742)

Estas expresiones me generan dos reflexiones:

  1. Dado que estos son autores relevantes y respetados en la profesión, ¿es esto un síntoma de que la economía formal puede volverse más ‘austriaca’?
  2. No se puede afirmar que el ciclo obedece a la teoría Mises-Hayek sin aceptar la teoría del capital (desde el punto de vista de Bohm-Bawerk). ¿Es la economía neoclásica consciente de esta disyuntiva?